

Struggling for Power

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
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Original article

Struggling for power over the Bangka coast: Tin amongst the vortex of companies, the state, and residents

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ABSTRACT

The unequal distribution of tin resources and profits on the Bangka Island coast is a major problem. This is due to the lack of a political settlement which has caused conflict between state-owned and private mining entrepreneurs, fishermen, and local governments. The central government has also failed to distribute power over the tin resources. This has led the parties to defend their rights by opposing, accepting aggression, and having divided attitudes. The local government's interests are in residents' welfare, profit sharing from mining, and the threat of environmental damage. This study has concluded that unequal access to tin resources in the Bangka coast will continue unless the state and the parties involved building a strong and inclusive political settlement.

1. Introduction

Bangka Belitung comprises islands in the Sumatra area, essentially the only tin-producing region in Indonesia. For centuries, tin has been mined on land but production has expanded into coastal areas in the last two decades. The expansion of tin mining on Bangka Island to the coastal area has increased profits and conflicts.

In 2017, offshore Mining Business Permits (MBP) covered 9.35% of the total marine area of Bangka Belitung and more than 50% of the marine MBPs were in the coastal fishing and tourism areas (Bappeda of Bangka Belitung, 2017). Before 1998, tin mining permits were granted only to companies licensed by the central government. However, this changed after 1998 when the government became more decentralised. Consequently, many companies exploited tin in coastal areas with separate licenses or partner management. In the past, offshore tin mining was monopolised by companies that obtained permits from the central government but became open to the public after the reformation movement in 1998. This is because illegal mining had increased with the issuance of permits by regional governments.

Offshore tin mining began to develop in 2005, with various forms of exploitation (Ibrahim et al., 2019). Floating mining (FM), production suction pontoons (PSP), and mining with production suction vessels (PSV) had been used in the previous decade. Subsequently, tin mining in coastal areas became a new problem when fishermen resisted the

aggressive actions of mining companies. Various companies representing PT. Timah, Tbk (PTT), the only state-owned company in this area, and Private Tin Companies (PTC) with independent permits or partnerships with PTT operate in many coastal locations on Bangka Island. However, the fishermen are disturbed and rebel, resulting in either conflict or agreement between the two (Ibrahim et al., 2019).

In Indonesia, mining conflicts are vertical disputes over authority between the central and regional governments and between the community and companies. This is usually based on injustice issue, where producing regions receive a small share (Hadi et al., 2015), and residents benefit the least. Conflicts are also caused by environmental damage from mining operations and residual conditions after mine closure (Resosudarmo et al., 2017). Conflicts are further influenced by cultural clashes, educational levels, geographical conditions, and regional government leadership styles (Priyo, 2012). In one case, the anti-mining attitude was caused by a mine expansion plan that demanded relocation, leading to resistance by local people (Muller, 2019). In addition, people have recently expressed various attitudes towards mining aggression in coastal areas due to the company's actions. This promotes horizontal conflicts when not handled properly. Disputes also focus on land tenure, unfair compensation and resource distribution, environmental degradation, poverty traps, and conflicts over human rights violations (Abuya, 2016). The dispute resolution strategy is too bureaucratic, less connected to the cultural and social intricacies of the

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local community, and orientated towards the company's requirements (Opoku and Asare, 2014).

The intersection of interests between actors in coastal tin mining depends on how each actor accepts or refuses, forces or seduces. Therefore, this study explores the struggle for tin resources amongst interested actors and takes the locus at four coastal points representing locations with tin conflicts on Bangka Island. The loci provide interesting discussions regarding the penetration of tin entrepreneurs into extraction efforts and processes and compare the responses of the affected communities. The study shows the dynamics of the power competition and relates the positions of companies, the country, and interest groups.

This study explained the resource dispute in developing countries and demonstrated that actor interests affect policy formulation adjustments. In general, actors create ways to achieve their interests and opportunities and build political settlements. It is important to study formal and informal structures and their dynamics in the resource extraction industry when considering residents' interests. This study showed a complex relationship in the power structure of tin resource extraction in communities and countries working in a regulatory format.

2. The struggle for natural resources

Natural resources are tantalizing commodities that cause aggression and discrimination to become inseparable. In the many experiences of countries rich in natural resources, financiers always play a vital role through regulations, indicating that aggression is formal domination. When financiers enter, residents' rights are lost because they lack large capital tools, are subject to regulations without any input, and are eliminated in the struggle. Furthermore, the poverty trap is symptomatic even when they must compete due to limited technology and techniques (Kumah et al., 2020; Burger, 2014).

The financiers' involvement is often characterised by unequal resistance. Violence arises, and corporations' power and business rights are protected by the government through regulations. Therefore, resistance or rejection often becomes criminalised (Billon and Middledorp, 2021) to ward off opponents. Furthermore, environmental activists are strongly opposed by corporations during the extraction process as they ignore sustainability. Subsequently, violent practice emerges and develops with the non-mediation with various interests. According to Grzybowski (2012), excluding local communities in decision-making and concentrating profits with a few people are the main causes of conflict in mining. In this regard, Hallgren & Hansson (2021) stated that transparency, advantages and disadvantages, and ecological risks should be discussed openly and democratically in decision-making in the natural resource exploration process. The unequal distribution of risks, impacts, and benefits drive resource conflicts. Just procedures and interactions are important to consider (Kemp et al., 2011), including sustainability and unsustainability (Kemp et al., 2011; Erb, 2016; Büscher and Davidov, 2015).

Szablowsky & Campbell (2019) stated that the government provides formal rights to companies and overrides local laws which are mostly local knowledge, residents, and informal working habits. However, the government and investment companies should build fair and beneficial contracts for all parties (Stevens et al., 2013). Accusations of obstructing company interests arise for those that obstruct mining, and this is permitted by regulations. According to Gudynas (2010), the impact of natural resource extraction on the environment is sometimes considered a sacrifice for greater interest and benefit.

When natural resources have been extracted at several locations, other untouched potential locales could be occupied. The important question is how resistance could deter exploitation. Argentina's experience restraining the aggressive attempts of financiers in exploiting natural resources is noteworthy (Walter and Wagner, 2021). This study observes that temporarily restraining the extraction of natural resources in an area requires a coalition of various provincial powers. The role of

local and national environmental movements with support from academics and professionals, including affected groups, such as fishermen and farmers, is crucial. The wider the involvement of civil society in mining policy, the stronger the community's resistance to natural resource extraction (Singh and Camba, 2020). Winanti & Hanif (2020) explained how civil society coalitions and their networks influence policy-making (Report of UN DPA and UNEP, 2015).

Natural resource extraction often presents a dilemma for a national government. Various studies show that a country often deregulates to promote investment but prevents local communities from utilising the natural environment they have long occupied. Moreover, with its natural resource extraction, capital aggression often makes local communities feel as though they oppose each other while the government remains detached. Local rights must be silenced through regulation and investment, which is regarded as a sacrificial process, as stated by Gudynas (2010). Therefore, the important question is whether it is possible for the two to exist concurrently and the country to take a middle ground. This question is consistent with Hilson et al. (2020), who suggested that each should defend itself through autonomy to strengthen each other amidst the interests of large and small miners. In this study, it may be understood as autonomy between mining entrepreneurs versus small groups whose interests are disrupted. According to Antoci et al. (2019), the entry of mining investment reduces poverty, though this is only temporary when the investment causes environmental damage.

In the Bangka Belitung Islands Province, tin extraction and various conflict dynamics have continued for centuries. Bangka Belitung is the largest tin exporter in Indonesia, with 69,189 tons of exports valued at USD 1390 billion in 2017 based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of Bangka Belitung Islands Province (2017). This figure is the second-largest worldwide after China, with 81,500 tons based on the International Tin Research Institute's Annual Report (2016).

The tin mining industry has been ongoing since the 18th century. It was initially controlled by the British Government and later by the Dutch Government, which sparked protests. During the colonial period, this led to armed conflict by Bangka leaders (Erman, 2010). The issuance of Law Number 11 of 1967 on the mining provisions marked the Indonesian Government's exploitation of minerals and coal and the regulation of the right to control minerals and coal by the central government. The Bangka Belitung Islands have long been rich in tin resources. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the tin potential in the area.

In the last two decades, mining has progressed dramatically due to the emergence of various conveniences in mining investment principally because tin is no longer a strategic commodity, as previously regulated by Law No. 11/1967. Tin mining has recently shifted to coastal areas, resulting in new conflicts with coastal communities that previously depended on these areas for their livelihoods. There is a struggle on the Coast of Bangka Island between local fishermen and foreign investors extracting tin in an area that the fishermen had controlled informally. The community becomes fragmented when companies launch various approaches. Furthermore, their competition and the country's position are examined in this study.

Disprose et al. (2020) showed that regulation plays a major role at the local level, including the extraction process dynamics. Institutional authorities formulate efforts to support the extraction process, including changing regulations that allow parties to take or offer an advantage. According to Disprose et al. (2020), actor attitudes influence their adjustments. Environmental damage issues and disruption of livelihoods are important and affect the capitalisation of the tin industry penetration process. Global power in the tin mining industry depends on local development and stability. There are conflicting interests between countries with social practices and environmental sustainability, and non-states with the sustainability of tin supply. The main issue is to execute each actor's interests and resolve those of other parties. The resource struggle becomes more complicated due to diverse interests and local needs, necessitating political settlement.




Fig. 1. Map of Tin Mining Business Permit Area (MBPA). Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, <https://geoportal.esdm.go.id/minerba/>.

John & Putzel (2009) defined political settlement as an understanding between elites. The model analysis was difficult because it required a study of the distribution of rights amongst actors competing for interests. This analysis determined whether the political settlement is inclusive (benefits local communities vulnerable to poverty) or exclusive (benefits elite groups) or in Ingram's perspective (2014) is mentioned as either a stable or an unstable settlement. According to this, the political settlement principle is cooperation between those with privileges and power instead of creating resistance. Such cooperation is the principle of interests bargaining. This form will also determine whether any agreement is durable or fragile.

There should be set conditions while bargaining in the political settlement process. John & Putzel (2009) stated that there should be protection of common economic interests and organisations need to manage the process, such as political parties, workers' associations, or other related groups. According to Dressel & Dinnen (2014), the political settlement benefits include formal and informal elite dynamics, promoting economic growth, institutional performance, and political stability.

Khan (2010) stated that the solution will be created when the distribution of the benefits runs consistently within society. The political settlement social order is based on a compromise between powerful groups. Therefore, the institution and distribution of power are important issues (Khan, 2010) that need to be reconciled to achieve economic and political stability. However, Khan stated that formal structures are not sufficient to distribute benefits in developing countries and should be supported by informal institutions, such as patron-client relationships. Informal institutions are significant in changing the power structure and affecting the distribution of the benefits from natural resource management.

3. Material and methods

This study uses a qualitative method by relying on interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and field observation data. The interviews were conducted with informants determined through a purposive sampling model using certain criteria. The informants were selected from groups that are part of the company and the government as regulation implementers. Others were selected from community groups interested in the discourse and presence of mining in their coastal area. The three groups represented those knowledgeable in the process and dynamics of

extracting resources in coastal areas. They were selected based on initial information collected before the study. The rest of the informants were determined based on field conditions that developed dynamically according to information needs. The information traced is the existing condition of the area, the dynamics of interests, and the approach pattern. Additionally, the information covered the mapping of residents, village and provincial governments, and company representatives. This study interviewed twenty people in depth at four selected sites.

Data were also collected through FGD with fishing groups, representatives of youth organizations, media agents, company representatives, academics, and government officials from the village, regency or city, and provincial levels. The FGD was conducted at the study locus level in each village and the provincial level by inviting representatives of interest groups and decision-making elements from the government bureaucracy. At each study location, twelve to fifteen participants were presented with interest groups, while at the provincial level, the FGD comprised fifteen and thirty participants, respectively. Furthermore, some of the information extracted was of the interests and expectations of each group, their experiences in dealing with the mining discourse, and the formulation considered most suitable.

Field observation was also conducted at the study location directly. Observations included the current conditions in the coastal area, the lives of residents, the extraction process and equipment used, and the potential of the surrounding area. In addition, the dynamics of several company persuasion strategies, the mediation process initiated, and the impact of tin mining was observed.

The locations chosen are Rebo and Matras Villages in Bangka Regency, Batu Perahu area in South Bangka Regency, and Penganak Hamlet in West Bangka Regency. These four areas have been widely discussed as having a high tin potential, though their residents have relatively different opinions regarding tin mining. The study process and manuscript preparation were carried out throughout 2019 and 2020.

4. Results and discussion

4.1. Tin capitalisation and the myth of partisanship

The end of the New Order era in 1998 and the entry of the decentralisation era fundamentally changed the socio-political aspects of tin mining on Bangka Island. This change was the claim of control over mining management by the Regional Government in the Regency or City

since its implementation in January 2001 (Erman, 2007). In the early decentralisation era, there was a power struggle between the central and regional governments regarding environmental interests and the people's economic interests. The monopoly on tin control by the country through PTT ended when the regions had the opportunity to regulate tin management so creating new competitors: PTC and the People's Miners (PM). Since then, competition has occurred between the central and regional governments, state and private companies, and companies and PM (Erman, 2007).

After a long debate, Law Number 4 of 2009 on Mining and Coal (familarly known as Mining Law) was passed as the best political decision to support the interests and expectations of mining stakeholders. It included implicit regulations regarding regional authority to regulate people's mining activities (Yunianto, 2009). The powers stipulated in the Mining Law were given to the Regent or mayor when Mining Business Permit Area (MBPA) was located within one regency or city. They were given to the governor when MBPA was located across regencies or municipalities within one province or the minister in cross-provincial areas after obtaining recommendations from local governors and regents or mayors.

Various problems arise from the Mining Law that only regulates the sustainability of the exploitation process and recognises the rights and obligations of the holders of MBP, Special Mining Business Permits (SMBP), and People's Mining Permits (PMP). Additionally, several regulated articles of the Mining Law criminalise and create the impression of community empowerment (Prayudi, 2016). The Mining Law prohibits permitted mining activities, while community empowerment is not explicitly stated.

The demand for share ownership by the regional government in state companies started in 1999 when the Bangka Regency Government wanted a 10% share although the demand later increased to 25% (Erman, 2007). This demand continued until Governor Erzaldi Rosman demanded a 10% share ownership for the Bangka Belitung Islands Provincial Government. For the Regional Government, the proportion of 3% royalties from exports of tin bars and land rent is not commensurate with the natural wealth recovered in Bangka Belitung, especially considering the environmental damage caused. However, mining companies deny this, arguing that they have followed all the convoluted regulations set by the government. L (government agent) stated that the presence of mining companies was not enough to contribute to the Bangka Belitung Islands, especially the areas directly affected. Therefore, these areas tried to attract funds through community development and empowerment programs, a responsibility of the mining companies.

PTT is a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) that supplies 40% of Indonesia's tin production. Based on its annual report (2018), it controlled a 9% world market share and struggles for recognition due to the proliferation of PTC as competitors. The impression of a tin monopoly resurfaced when only PTT could freely export tin in 2019. As a result, some PTC as Registered Exporters (RE) of tin bars could not export. This was due to the issuance of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Decree Number 1827 of 2018 on Good Mining Engineering Rules. The decree requires Competent Person Indonesia (CPI) to report exploration results and resource, mineral, and coal reserve estimates. Only state companies have CPI, impacting the decline in tin bar exports. Several private universities cooperated with the state company in response to the regulation, buying tin sand from the PTT MBPA and sending tin bars to PTT for export. In mid-2019, several RE holding companies exported themselves, though they were still cooperating with PTT.

There are stringent regulations for the tin trade system that prioritises the status of clean and clear land, the compatibility between production and mining sequences, and the need for companies to have a CPI to confirm the origin of goods. These regulations are a follow-up to the impact of policy deregulation. In an interview, Yz (a company employee) stated that PTT's marine MBPA is less than five nautical miles, and detailed exploration has been conducted at several locations. In comparison, private MBP owners at sea are beyond five nautical

miles. Furthermore, Yz questioned the tin source of PTC, considering that the private MBP area is insufficient for their production.

The proliferation of illegal small-scale mining by residents triggers smuggling, resulting in a large fraction of world tin production and a decline in tin prices in the global market. R (mining agent) stated that smuggling activities have been ongoing for a long time, involving many parties, including the police. Furthermore, Ek (media agent) stated that the existence of FM in the South Bangka Regency cannot be banned because of the involvement of government staff in tin mining. Ag (the company's agent) stated that the government seemed to ignore illegal FM activities. In the case of Rebo, the fishing group rejected the licensed PSV but accepted illegal marine mining.

The government's obsession with large-scale tin extraction began with the executive decision of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 558/MPP/KEP/12/1998. It excluded tin commodities from the export-controlled goods, followed by a regional autonomy policy, including authority in mining governance. The Bangka Regency Government responded to this by issuing Regional Regulation No. 6 of 2001. The regulation allows the people's participation in mining activities according to the stipulated provisions. The extensive decentralisation process has led to the pragmatism of local elites to deregulate tin governance. Consequently, this weakens the authority of a sovereign country over its natural resources (Ibrahim, 2016). The central government's exclusion of tin from export-controlled goods allows regional governments and residents to participate in mining. This tin deregulation, has broad implications.

For more than 40 years, the mining business was monopolised by the Mining Authority (MA), owned by PTT, and the Contract of Work (CoW), owned by PT. Koba Tin (PTKt), whose CoW ended on March 31, 2013. In the early 2000s, MBPs, owned by PTC and PMP were issued. By 2017, the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources identified 854 tin mining business permits with 997,761 hectares and six locations of People's Mining Areas (PMA) with about 16,000 hectares in the regency/city of the Bangka Belitung Islands (interview Ir, regional government element, 2019). Efforts to exploit tin mining are carried out at sea and on land.

There are five models of tin mining activities. First, companies or MBP owners mine tin directly through their mining units. Secondly, MBP owners partner with third parties or sub-contractors. Thirdly, MBP owners and subcontractors partner with residents. Fourthly, tin mining activities are carried out by PMP holders. Fifthly, illegal mining is conducted by the community. Many companies later adopted a partnership system with subcontractors and residents as agents. The release of government control over tin regulations triggered liberalisation that negatively impacted tin production by PTT and PTKt. Subsequently, Seventy percent of PTT's production and 80% of PTKt's production was supplied by partnering with Unconventional/Illegal Mines (UM) (Erman, 2010).

Mining activities penetrate the protected and conservation forest areas and nearby watersheds (Sibarani, 2017). In early 2000, tin mining was carried out on land but shifted to coastal areas using PSV and UM (Ibrahim et al., 2018a). The proliferation of parties that mine by involving the residents and migrants has caused very severe environmental damage. According to Erman (2008), the mining system conducted by UM is orientated towards short-term profits and results in a critical environment damage. Furthermore, many negative reports show the impact of environmental damage due to UM on land and at sea, including mining activities on reclaimed land (Bidayani, 2009; Erwana et al., 2015; The Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, 2015; Nurtjahya et al., 2017; Pratama, 2018).

Marine mining operations have caused widespread marine damage. At the marine mining, there could be proportionally less gravel and more sand in the directly affected zone than the indirectly affected region (Cooper et al., 2007). Furthermore, the species and individuals on the seabed are significantly less in the directly affected area, though the results include the dominant effect of tidal current-induced sediment

instability. A previous study showed that the ecological consequences of seabed mineral extraction are not only limited to the direct movement of organisms but also includes habitat loss and modification of seafloor morphology, physiological disturbances to organisms, and changes in intra and interspecific competition patterns, affecting the structure of food chains (Kaikkonen et al., 2018). The fishermen stated that marine mining has reduced their fishing potential and increased the distance to the sea (Ibrahim et al., 2018a).

The economic dependence of high-producing regions on tin mining is also a logical reason why mining activities become a priority and ignores negative impacts. This is evident in the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) value of the tin mining sector and its processing industry. The industry contributes more than 20% to the total GRDP of the Bangka Belitung Islands Province. Moreover, it provides an output of approximately 30% as raw material for tin metal processing based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (2018). For the mining community, tin mining is the main livelihood that helps drive the village economy; the income earned daily is small and is only sufficient for daily needs (Sulista, 2019a; 2019b).

These facts demonstrate that the reform era has opened access to tin mining for local communities, benefiting entrepreneurs, while UM miners only act as suppliers (Ibrahim et al., 2018). Sulista (2019b) found how tin from UM was purchased by village collectors that obtained capital from investors outside the village.

Erman (2008) showed that tin commodities could accommodate the interests of politicians to obtain support, funding, and promote local economic improvement. Economic, political, and personal conflicts underlie debates and discussions on deregulation. They underlie rival regulations between the Regents, Mayors, Governors, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in Jakarta. Erman (2008) also stated individual competition between the Regent and Governor and political competition between parties existed. Additionally, there is business competition between PTT protected by the Ministry of Mines and Energy in Jakarta and PTC protected by the Regional Head. In electing regional heads, campaign funds are closely related to tin entrepreneurs that provide capital for political activities (Erman, 2010). The government and officials maintain the status quo and ignore illegal mining, letting environmental damage run out of control (Ibrahim et al., 2018b). Tin mining policy creates an economic structure that perpetuates a double standard by maintaining the current situation.

This condition triggers several interesting questions of the actual beneficiaries and the parties involved. Another question concerns the model and the benefit to residents when entrepreneurs side with the community. The question arises regarding the difficulty in benefit-sharing even for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) when the regional government sides with residents in producing areas. When local illegal miners take sides because of their claim of ownership and sovereignty over local wealth, the concern is that they feel entitled and sovereign when democratisation provides space to sue. These questions are explored in the next section by answering why each actor takes its particular path.

There are at least seven stakeholders in the tin mining industry, including central and regional governments, local communities, suppliers and small-scale miners, traders, investors, and law enforcement (Irawan et al., 2014). The stakeholder with the highest interest and power is the central government because it performs the mandate of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. The Regional Government has an interest as a producing region whose economy depends on tin commodities and has a regulatory nature. Moreover, Indonesia, as a tin-producing country, is interested in world tin supply and looks for competitive prices (Taylor and Burton, 2013). Investors have an interest in the sustainability of their business. Also, they have strength through high-power capital and the network of regional and central governments and law enforcement. For the mining community, tin mining is a source of income with a multiplier impact (Purnaweni et al., 2019). In law

enforcement, there is an opportunity to weaken the law against violations committed by business stakeholders and profit from these actions (Haryadi, 2015).

Based on the Industry of Finance-Revenue Sharing Fund (2017) records, Indonesia has regulated the General Mining Revenue Sharing Fund (RSH) with the principle of origin and land rent and royalty. Land rent is calculated according to the exploitation area, while the royalty is 3% of the export of tin bars. Of the 3%, one-fifth is reserved for the Central Government and the remaining four-fifths for producing regions. In this case, the producing regions are the Provincial Government of the Bangka Belitung Islands and the regency or city government. The average contribution of RSH to regional income is more than 6% for West Bangka Regency. Of that 6%, between 3 and 5% is for the Provincial Government of the Bangka Belitung Islands, Central Bangka Regency, South Bangka Regency, and East Belitung Regency, and less than 2% for Pangkalpinang City. In practice, the funds cannot be justified as allocated for mining-affected villages because their use is included in the overall planning budget.

Input-output analysis using data from the Central Bureau of Statistics for 2015 shows that the output of the tin mineral extraction industry is dominated by intermediate demand, including salaries, wages, and operating profits. Consequently, there is a gap in economic benefits between the company and the community around the area of operation. The gap leads to demands that residents also deserve to enjoy benefits from tin in the form of a fee per unit weight. However, the cash profit-sharing has caused local turmoil due to non-transparency and allocation that does not lead to long-term economic independence. Furthermore, the claim that tin is an alternative livelihood for small-scale miners shows that the biggest profits are obtained by the capital owners outside the community cycle (Sulista, 2019b). The government is reluctant to admit to unofficial activities because they contribute insignificantly to state revenues compared to formal mining entities. And, illegal miners prefer bribing security guards and cooperating with local authorities, following regulations, and watching their resources be controlled by large mining companies (Lestari, 2013).

Each stakeholder secures and takes advantage of the tin mineral extraction results by relying on their capacity. Business people and investors benefit the most in the tin trading system, while smallholders and regional governments receive a very small proportion. Subsequently, some abandoned areas, such as Lampung Village, which used to be PTT's area of operation, ended up almost becoming dead cities (Indra, 2013). In the case of villages around the mine, some communities become smallholder miners with limited assets. Some return to agriculture without any intervention in the community's self-reliance activity program that the company should have been running (Sulista, 2019a).

The weak power of the Regional Government is evident in the refusal of demands that wish to own shares in the state company. Consequently, the regional government has insufficient power over the claim of disproportionate production from the Bangka Belitung Islands where production has been ongoing for centuries. The central government, which has complete power, struggles with regulations to ensure smooth mining operations. It does not consider that tin should be the prime mover in realising the economic independence of the Bangka Belitung Islands.

The intersection of interests and efforts to map them in tin mining on Bangka Island is described as follows:

Fig. 2 shows the intersection of interests between actors in the struggle for tin resources on Bangka Island. The arrows show the process control, while the relationship lines show the interrelationship's influence. The complex relationship began when the central government arranged permits for large companies beyond 12 nautical miles, with mining concessions largely awarded in the past. To a certain extent, the provincial government could permit private companies up to 12 nautical miles under the previous regulation, where tin is more abundant and can be mined more readily without special equipment needed for deep-sea




Fig. 2. The intersection of interests between actors.

exploration. In addition, besides obtaining permits, PTC could work with PTT to help it extract from its land assets to balance production. PTT is seeking support to smelt materials rather than operate alone and is frustrated in the face of resistance from residents.

The regional government could provide PMP to residents, while PTT and PTC could allow their land to be mined by the people, provided they sell tin to them. However, the PMP is too restrictive, while UM develops massively in PTT and PTC land and in protected and prohibited locales. The country should consider the interests of many people that depend not only on tin for their livelihood. Some people resist and continue working in the coastal areas that have supported them for so long. This complexity shows that while the status quo continues, each fights for its interests. Diprose et al. (2020) stated that the actors' attitudes affect the adjustment process, making it difficult to resolve their interests without cooperation. This is in line with this study which showed that all parties' attitudes persisted.

4.2. Those struggling for coastal resources

Tin is mined in the coastal area of Bangka Island with various adaptation patterns and penetration processes. This study recorded at least three attitudes in four locations as the entry point for further discussions. An accommodative attitude is shown by coastal residents in Penganak Hamlet, West Bangka Regency. In this area, fishermen and offshore mines work together and respect each other. By contrast, in Bukit Perahu, South Bangka Regency, a different attitude is demonstrated in the firm refusal of the residents, marked by the departure of PSV after a few weeks. Furthermore, in Matras and Rebo, included in the Bangka Regency area, the residents both demonstrated disagreement emphasising the gap in attitudes, as both resisted the entry of marine mining into their coastal areas.

Ded, Ek, Ret (local journalists) stated that the local community's character greatly influenced this resistance. The refusal was because the mining company, PTT ignored the welfare of residents. This is different from illegal FM in the Permis area of South Bangka Regency, where illegal mining activities run smoothly because the community benefits greatly. The partnership system, therefore, reduces conflict and secures the tin resources owned by mining companies. Unfortunately, when conflict escalates involving pro- and anti-mining local groups, the

company is often absent, allowing the situation to occur. As a result, social resistance is formed because of the presence of the mine.

Local communities realise the economic benefits of tin mining activities and the environmental damage caused (Ibrahim et al., 2019c). They need to obtain transparent information about the risks and benefits of mining and how the government uses profits from mining. In this case, repressive and intimidating approaches should not be strategies to deal with public protests against mining (Alfirdaus, 2019). Authority is currently vested in the provincial government. It is important to correctly identify the role of regency or city governments in mining governance as they are geographically closest to local communities (Alfirdaus, 2019).

The rights of MBP holders or entrepreneurs to mine are regulated in the Mining Law in article 134. It states that rights to mining areas do not include land surface rights. Moreover, Article 138 states that the right to a business permit does not constitute ownership of land rights. This rule is explained technically in Government Regulation Number 23 of 2010 article 100. It states that the business permit holder that conducts production operations must settle land rights in the WP with the land rights holder and provide compensation based on mutual agreement.

State protection in mining activities can be seen in Mining Law No. 4 of 2009 article 162. It states that people could be punished for obstructing or hindering permitted mining activities. State protection of citizens is regulated by article 145, which is only related to compensation for the land of directly affected communities. By contrast, in marine areas, which are public, there are fishermen's rights to catch fish in addition to tin mining concessions.

The situation is that people in the affected areas are prosperous and fairly compensated for the impacts on their lives. Mining threatens their livelihoods involving business people, communities, officials, and sometimes regional government officials. The anti-mining movement only consists of local communities, particularly fishermen's groups, responding to the mining activities affecting coastal areas.

PTT is the main Indonesian tin producer, controlling the marine SMBP with 184,400 hectares located at 0–5 nautical miles. Based on state property and permits owned, socialisation and negotiations are conducted because refusal means opposing the law. Agu (company element) stated the need to reject legal companies while illegal ones are left without regional government control. Involving the community in

mining plans is one way for the company to suppress residents' resistance. MBP owners use this partnership system by allowing residents to mine in partnership with MBP holders directly or with sub-contractors. Gat and Ali (regional government element) and Bon (PSV management element) stated that the tin produced by local miners was sold directly to companies as their partners.

Residents have carried out intense resistance movements in coastal areas. This began when PSV replaced the Dredger Ship (DS) entering the Bangka waters, prompting residents to assume DS cause turbidity and shallow the sea (Bidayani and Kurniawan, 2020). Subsequently, negotiations were carried out by the company. In Penganak area, B (company element) stated that the residents' resistance arose because of social jealousy surrounding certain elements that benefited from the PTT partner's PSV activities. The residents, especially fishermen that felt the impact of damage in the waters, were not properly compensated. The company subsequently involved influential community leaders in negotiating with representatives of residents to agree on profit sharing for the village.

In Batu Perahu, residents' strong resistance only emerged when the PSV owned by the Sumber Jaya Indah Company (SJIC) was ready to be exercised. Fa and Ap (village government element and fisherman) stated that fishermen rejected marine mining because they were operating in fishing zones. Furthermore, Ap stated that granting the SJIC MBP was odd because the entrepreneur did not socialise the Batu Perahu fishermen that fished in those waters. According to Gn (government element), the regency government that issued permits maintained that environmental permits, public consultation, and socialisation had been fulfilled. Furthermore, the publication of survey minutes signed by the village government and entrepreneurs was ordered by higher government officials. This came after the socialisation by ignoring the community elements involved (interview with Gn, 2019).

The fishermen refused because they were worried about the impact of legal SJIC's mining. They were also concerned about the emergence of UM backed by unscrupulous officers that would destroy the beaches and coasts where boats dock and fishermen relax. It is feared that mining activities would become unmanageable because the surrounding area contains significant tin reserves (interview J, 2019). This condition occurred in Matras, where most residents initially accepted PTT partner's PSV with several agreements. For instance, the company exercised social responsibility to the community, especially towards fishermen, and involved residents in tin mining activities (interview R, 2019). However, besides residents, miners from outside the village suspected of being backed by the authorities were present. This was unacceptable to marginalised residents. As a result, the presence of miners from outside the village had increased resistance to mining in their area.

The fishermen's strong demands urged the Regent to revoke the SJIC MBP. This triggered a new conflict between the regional government and PSJIC, and the case proceeded to the State Administrative Court. Although SJIC prevailed in court, there was no compensation to be paid by the regional government. This confirmed that the company had the right to the MBP in the area (interview with Mt, 12/09/2019), although fishermen could still refuse. The result was that these tin reserves became unusable, impacting Regional Original Income as there were no royalties, and the regional government authority was at stake.

The reform tin mining regime positioned residents, rich and poor, men and women, as the main UM actors in illegal activities and environmental damage. The family's economic demands often require that children become the main actors in tin mining (Saputra, 2018). UM activities correlate with the agricultural sector, resulting in the decline in pepper and rubber commodity prices. In this regard, a simple linear analysis shows that this activity increased between 2015 and 2017 (Sulista, 2019c). Therefore, the government seeks to accommodate people that could legally mine through the PMP concept and partner with MBP holders or its sub-contractors. The tin produced by the residents would be purchased by sub-contractors and the MBP owner. Subsequently, the royalties would be received by the government.

However, environmentally unfriendly mining is inevitable and backfires on the government.

5. Almost no position: the dilemma of the country's position

The country must maximise its use of natural resources for the people's prosperity, as stated in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. Through PTT, tin resources are utilised for the country's and community's benefit, however, the demands of the regions to regulate tin governance show that they do not sufficiently benefit from three centuries' worth of natural wealth. The benefits include royalty revenue sharing and tin-based welfare improvement. However, since the country must also accommodate various interests, regulations are made as to the best decision.

Tin mining companies in Bangka Island have devised two strategies to secure their economic interests and restore the image caused by damaging mining activities. First, the pretext of sustainable mining focuses on socio-economic and environmental aspects through CSR activities for economic development. Advances in environmentally friendly mining technology known as Bore Hole Mining (BHM) are claimed to minimise environmental damage and increase production. This would replace technology that uses more destructive PSV (interview with Ag and Ai, entrepreneur element). Secondly, the partnership system involves residents, who could mine, profit share, and reclaim, reducing anti-mining resistance. It aims to improve the economy and give them a sense of ownership of the tin resource.

The local regulation of The Zoning Plan for Coastal Areas and Small Islands resulted from legislation that suggested regulating marine spatial development. In the context of Bangka Belitung, the preparation of this document poses a complicated problem considering the study that led to the MBPA reduction of mining companies, especially those owned by PTT. The conflict arose because the plan document contained a reduction area of land for state and private companies of more than 130,000 and 180,000 hectares, respectively. The proportion of the planned reduction of PTT's marine MBPA is more than 70%, while the marine MBPA of private companies is still divided. Ag (company element) conveyed the company's objection, stating that the government forced them to reduce the marine MBPA land, though they had obtained permission. When the land area was reduced, there would have been a significant loss on their part, including layoffs of company employees. There are claims from mining companies and regional governments that less than five nautical miles are secondary tin zones.

Fb (government element) stated that there should be a harmonisation arrangement between the fisheries, mining, and tourism sectors through the local regulation of The Zoning Plan for Coastal Areas and Small Islands document. Although this is a valid concept, there would be political interference. The government recognises that the economic value of mining is greater. However, it is necessary to regulate mining, fishery, and tourism spaces for future interests. Additionally, companies need to upgrade technology to minimise environmental damage and compensate for losses to fishermen. Although the deep sea has not been explored, the fishery sector should upgrade technology to realise greater economic value.

There is inequality between the tin resources that have been exploited and the benefits realised by producing regions. The preparation of the Master Plan for Community Empowerment Development (CED) is mentioned in the Mining Law, and Government Regulation 23 of 2010 on the Implementation of Mineral and Coal Mining Business Activities implied in articles 106, 107, 108, and 109. It implies an obligation to submit the CED Program as part of the Annual Corporate Budget Work Plan and submit a 6-month realisation report. In this case, CED aims to improve the economy, education, socio-culture, health, and the environment of the community living around the mine. Additionally, it intends to raise the community's individual or collective quality of life. However, the regulation has omitted several important points, including preparing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and the CED

program by the implementing unit formed by the mining business entity.

The process of recovering tin resources in coastal areas is shown in Fig. 3.

The scheme in Fig. 3 shows two elements of tin mining that determine each other but play safely in the recovery of tin resources in the coastal area of Bangka Island. These are PTT, a state company entitled to regional concessions, and the government or country that should stand above various interests. PTT handed over part of the extraction process and adaptation of some concessions to companies or partners. As a result, those dealing directly with residents are their partners. In contrast, the country has a dual-position between the interests of coastal residents and companies with mining rights. This results in three main conditions, including those that firmly reject, those divided in two, and those that accept. Therefore, PTT and regional governments allow the three approaches to work together.

This study offers an anomaly to Walter & Wagner (2021), which presupposed that unified local forces would promote efforts to restrain financier occupation in natural resource expansion. In addition, as an extension of the central government, the regional government should negotiate with investors for the community's benefit with its decentralised authority. However, it should let the dynamics work by themselves, with minimal involvement except as necessary. This contradicts Hilson et al. (2020), which showed the need for each element to maintain and build its autonomy because of differing interests. The refusal of the Batu Perahu residents was because the fishermen's livelihoods would be disrupted. The acceptance of the Penganak residents is the attraction of CSR and other support. In comparison, the acceptance and rejection of Matras and Rebo residents were due to their different economic interests and orientations. Therefore, the parties were unable to build autonomies as they would interfere with one another.

The coastal area with all its resources remains a contested region. This condition reduces the residents' persistence to against stronger temptation or pressure as companies allow space for various approaches. Therefore, residents that persist with their knowledge are faced with investors' aggression and the country's dual attitude that takes no sides.

The state has an opportunity to implement efforts in resolving the issue of the interests. So, political settlement depends on the state as the regulator and actor of resources and benefits distribution. Diprose et al. (2020) explained that the regulatory framework is significant in the natural resource extraction process, including policy changes. The state amended policy in tin management in 1998, then followed several changes. However, the policy changes increased the number of actors competing for tin resources instead of creating equal profits distribution. This indicates that the state, PTT as an extension of state business, and local governments have failed in efforts for a political settlement. However, PTT and local governments are state organs that should prioritise the local community welfare and contribute profits to state

revenue.

John & Putzel (2009) stated that political settlement involves interests bargaining and compromise between parties. The cooperation between parties should be based on their rights, not resistance. Therefore, it is difficult to fight for their rights with different interests. The tin entrepreneurs obtain land concessions and permits from formal institutions. This makes it quite challenging for the residents to defend their rights while mining continues. As a result, some rights are deprived, specifically the economic benefits for fishermen. Additionally, political compromise efforts have been attempted without formal state institutions' participation. The compromise includes tin entrepreneurs providing a fee-sharing per unit of tin produced, though this process is fragile. The fragility is attributed to the fact that the fee is relatively small compared to the long-term environmental damage and disruption of residents' livelihoods. John & Putzel (2009) stated that the political settlement is exclusive, meaning it only benefits the elite.

According to Dressel & Dinnen (2014), political settlement cannot be achieved without fulfilling the necessary conditions, including removing unequal profit distribution, avoiding the lack of government efforts at cooperation, and eliminating conflicts causing political instability. Khan (2010) stated that institutions and distribution are significant in achieving a political settlement. The state should regulate distribution to avoid actors' conflict in their activities, supported by formalisation. In addition, conflicts occur when residents' interests are disturbed, forcing them to take action. The state should provide stability instead of allowing the residents to act independently. In general, it allows conflict between PTT and the local government as both compete for tin control on the coast.

The study demonstrated that political settlement will be achieved when the central government takes the role of the ultimate actor. Furthermore, all actors are subject to government provisions, as shown in the state's regulating policy on tin mining. Therefore, the main issue is the consistent regulation of power distribution and actors' regulation amidst political and economic pressure.

6. Conclusions

This study discussed various actors interested in natural resource wealth in the coastal area of Bangka Island and the methods used to survive with their respective choices. The coastal area has tremendous tin potential. This wealth is in harmony with the lives of coastal residents that have been familiar with their livelihoods as fishermen and their tourism potential. However, PTT and PTC, which have mining concessions, are supported by the government through regulations that control the extraction process. Furthermore, this study shows the complex relationship between various interested actors, such as the central and regional governments, mining companies, and residents all competing for the benefits derived from tin recovery. There are




Fig. 3. Scheme of Struggle for Tin Resources in Coastal Areas.

investment interests that impact economic cycles and the people's and the environment's interests that should be maintained sustainably. The status quo with its respective dynamics seems to be a future option.

The country represented by the central and regional governments has failed to determine the ideal position in the competition for coastal resources. In the four locations studied, three attitudes are held by residents, including refusing, accepting, as well as half-accepting, and half-refusing. Although mining companies use various methods, crystallising people's attitudes, they cause the country and PTT to take a conditional approach. Therefore, the chosen attitude is to allow residents to work in their own way while searching for an alternate solution.

The continuation of this condition would reduce the resistance movement as the company persuades and pressures citizens. Every party involved wants its interest accommodated by the government first. However, when the country's government chooses not to be involved, the interests of residents would slowly dissipate. Furthermore, the debates about environmental damage would strengthen with the absence of the government in developing a solution amongst various interests.

This study showed that a political settlement will be achieved when the state regulates the equitable distribution and allocation of benefits amongst interested parties. However, the actors take their actions to achieve their rights. This condition is ignored and the parties lack efforts for political agreements and compromises in the reconcilable interests. Therefore, efforts for cooperation and profit bargaining to build political settlements are still fragile and exclusive.

The study recommended that the state through the central government should facilitate dispute resolutions over the competition for tin resources on the Bangka Island coast. Mining policy reforms can be created using long-term regulations based on a win-win principle. This regulatory reform should include efforts to limit non-environmentally friendly mining and investment interests, residents' income, and environmental damage incurred by the local government, and profit-sharing. Furthermore, the parties should comply with the mining and non-mining zones and focus on sustainable development instead of profits.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors do not have a conflict of interest with the parties, directly and indirectly, involved in this study.

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